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Abstract
We describe a computer model of general effectiveness of a hierarchical organization depending on
two main aspects: effects of promotion to managerial levels and efforts to self-promote of individual
employees, reducing their actual productivity. The combination of judgment by appearance in the
promotion to higher levels of hierarchy and the Peter Principle (which states that people are
promoted to their level of incompetence) results in fast declines in effectiveness of the organization.
The model uses a few synthetic parameters aimed at reproduction of realistic conditions in typical
multilayer organizations. It is shown that improving organization resiliency to self-promotion and
continuity of individual productiveness after a promotion can greatly improve the overall organization
effectiveness.
Organization Productivity, Peter Principle, Agent Based Modeling
 Introduction
Computer simulations have become increasingly popular in describing social phenomena, from trafﬁc
jams to opinion formation. The number of topics and works is very large and there are even popular
expositions of the discipline, such as Ball (2004). In some cases the new tools provide signiﬁcant
insight into observed phenomena. In some others the simulations may add a level of understanding
into already formulated explanations of real world phenomena. In this work we present a computer
model of general effectiveness of hierarchical organizations, focused at effects of individual
effectiveness of employees. The model aims at extending the the famous Peter Principle (Peter &
Hull 1969): "In a hierarchy every employee tends to rise to his level of incompetence". Thus in any
hierarchical organization global effectiveness is diminished due to the fact often skills which make a
person an excellent worker at a given level in the organization may be unsuited at a higher one.
Promotion of the best employees (which looks like a reasonable way of action from the point of view
of employee recognition and motivation) results in loss of skilled workers and, possibly, creation of
less than optimal managers. Of course, such ineffective manager would no longer be promoted, so
eventually everyone would become stuck at their level of incompetence. Peter originally formulated
this idea in a joke-like fashion, but once we recognize its importance, it becomes pretty obvious and
common sense.
It should be noted that companies ﬁght against the “incompetence stasis” resulting from Peter
Principle via constant pressure on employees: promoting the best is usually accompanied by ﬁring
the worst performers at each level of hierarchy. But while this leads to culling of non-performers, it
might mean loss of capable lower level employees who have been promoted beyond their skill range.
The process creates a bad manager from a good worker, and then gets rid of the bad manager. This
problem can in turn be solved by providing horizontal career paths, which ensure that the best
specialists could be recognized and awarded without changing the nature of their tasks, so that their
skills would not be lost upon promotion. Yet, despite the fact that Peter Principle is known for forty
years, examples of loss of productivity due to promoting people beyond their capacities are present
in almost all types of hierarchical organizations, from scientiﬁc research to commercial companies.
The topic has already been studied well beyond the original witty insight. Mathematical analyses
appeared as early as one year after the original book (for example Kane (1970)). The topic is quite1.4
2.1
2.2
actively researched. For example, a computer model of Peter Principle in action has been recently
published by Pluchino et al. (2010), while earlier works on the topic include Fairburn & Malcomson
(2001); Lazear (2001); Lazear (2004); Dickinson and Villeval (2007). In this paper we attempt to go
beyond the earlier approaches, which assume that the basis for promotions is the actual
performance of the organization members. Our motivation comes from experience that decisions to
hire and promote are based on perceived performance. Thus, employees or external candidates who
focus on presenting themselves and their own results in good light (instead of just working) have
better chances of advancement. Such individual public relations activity or self-promotion is quite
natural and present everywhere: in commercial companies, universities or political parties. The result
is that not only people reach their incompetency level, but also that the whole promotion process
often focuses on those who have little to contribute to the organization but rather direct their efforts to
(and spend their time on) getting promoted, attempting to cheat the evaluation systems based on
measurements of performance. The observation has been made by Scott Adams (Adams (1996)),
who, discussing Peter Principle, remarked that "incompetent workers are promoted directly to
management, without ever passing through competence stage". While the negative effects of Peter
Principle are beyond doubt, as Adams observes, ￊit provided a boss who may not understand his
present job, but at least understood that of his subordinates. If promotions not only change the nature
of the required skills but also depend on superﬁcial characteristics, presented for the beneﬁt of the
people who decide promotions, the results can be, and often are, much worse. This combination of
the two phenomena, which we propose to call the Dilbert-Peter Principle limits the effectiveness of
organizations. The name has already been used by Faria (2000).
It might seem presumptuous to use ﬁctitious Pointy Haired Boss and other characters featured in the
Dilbert strip as “real world” basis for computer modeling. Would it not be better to use ofﬁcial
company data, histories and performance ﬁgures as a source for inspiration for a simulation model?
In our opinion, just the contrary. The ofﬁcial documents are usually written with the purpose of hiding
the very mistakes and ineffectiveness we want to discuss. On the other hand, due to the popularity
of the strip and its web site( http://www.dilbert.com), the accumulated “database” of cases of stupidity
and mismanagement is much better and true to life than the ofﬁcial corporate proﬁles and annual
reports. Author's own experience gathered in the course of over 15 years of work in several
commercial companies (Polish, American, German and French) and more than ten years within an
academic institution, suggests that Dilbert jokes are often an uncannily accurate descriptions modern
organizations. Thousands of letters sent to Scott Adams from all over the world conﬁrm this
experience. In many areas we ﬁnd organizations which share similar activities, sizes and structures,
yet which differ widely in their effectiveness. This is true for both commercial companies and public
organizations. Our goal is to ﬁnd which which aspects of the model are crucial in determination of the
overall productivity, and perhaps to suggest measures to improve the operations in real life.
 Model description
The purpose of the model is to provide a simpliﬁed description of effectiveness of a hierarchical
organization in which people act to maximize their promotion chances. The promotions are achieved
through comparisons of individuals within a given hierarchy level. This is similar to internal
tournament models, introduced by Lazear and Rosen (1981). Before we discuss further, a brief note
about the meaning of productivity is needed here. We follow Pritchard (1990), who discusses broad
range of meanings of the term, used to note output, individual performance, production, proﬁtability
competitiveness, work quality of individuals, groups and organization units. Prichard equates
productivity with efﬁciency or effectiveness, deﬁnes as measure of outputs divided by inputs and by
relationship of outputs to some standards. One of the key differentiators of the model is the division
between real or effective productivity (for example sales results, number of research publications,
lines of code accepted into a project) and perceived productivity, as seen by the authorities
responsible for making promotion decisions. While the effectiveness of the whole organization is
measured by accumulating the real output of the contributors, their advancement within the
organization is related to comparative perceived results. Observations show that often it is not the
best performer that gets promoted (as postulated by the original Peter Principle) but those who
appear to be the best workers.
In our model we assume that all employees are trying to get promoted. The actual incentives
(increased salaries, more power and status etc.) and beneﬁts are not discussed. We also assume
that the employees understand the real productivity/perceived productivity difference and have
therefore the two main strategies to achieve promotion. The ﬁrst is via improvement of the real
output, based on hope that it would be noticed and rewarded. The second strategy, observed all too
frequently, is through the use of political games, thanks to which a person appears to be more
productive and worthy of advancement. This is an extension of the classical approach in which
employees signal their abilities by means of an effort display (MacLeod and Malcolmson (1988)).
Here, the effort might be in pure signalling, with less focus on the actual job in hand. Such difference
has been stressed many years ago by Spence (1973), who remarked that while job applicants can
do little about their actual results and indices measuring them, signals are under employee control
and can be subject to manipulation. In many cases, these individual PR activities are done at the2.3
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expense of the actual work, thereby decreasing the contribution of the individual to the overall
organizational effectiveness. Within the model, each agent has a ﬁxed “psychological makeup”,
deciding on the actual mix of strategies used. In contrast to real life, agents can not modify their
behavior. But, as we are interested in checking who gets promoted and how the process of
promotion determines the composition of management levels and overall productivity of the company,
keeping agents' characteristics ﬁxed seems a reasonable simpliﬁcation.
Following Pluchino et al. (2010) we propose to compare two possible scenarios, differing in
description of individual productivity after the promotion. The ﬁrst one, called continuity scenario
('common sense' in Pluchino et al. (2010)), in which the productivity at the new post is similar to the
one at the previous one. Such situation is expected when the range of tasks related to the new
position remains similar to the previous ones. The Peter scenario assumes that due to difference in
tasks at different levels of the organization the productivity at the new post is unrelated to the old one.
In both cases our current model measures the perceived productivity, including effects of internal
politics. We investigate the effects of promotion process on key characteristics of the organization:
its general productivity, averages of effectiveness at various levels of the hierarchy, dynamics of
changes due to the promotion preferences.
The simulations presented here are designed to include several phenomena associated with modern
enterprises and organizations, namely hierarchical organization, management contribution,
measurements of effects dependent on both individual qualities and cumulative results of
subordinates and interplay between in-company promotion and external hiring. The goal of the model
is to provide some predictions regarding the dependence of the measured qualities on a few simple
controls: importance of the political gamesmanship for promotion, heritability of skills after promotion
(the continuity model versus Peter hypothesis) and tendency for internal or external advancement.
Presented results are based on a small number of selected conditions and, we hope, can be a
starting point for a more advanced study.
The basic model applies to organizations in which activities are uniform, i.e. where the nature of
tasks is the same for all positions at a given hierarchy level. Examples might be provided by some
government institutions (such as tax ofﬁces), research institutions or by specialized parts of larger
bodies, for example sales divisions in large corporations. While the basic tasks and measurement
criteria per level are comparable throughout the organization, advancing from one level to another
might change (sometimes very signiﬁcantly) the nature of the job: from tax collection or sales to
management, more and more remote from the outside world as we move up in hierarchy.
Hierarchical structure
We are interested here in department based hierarchical organizations, such as a commercial
company with many local sales ofﬁces, or large software house with multiple project teams. To a
certain degree this description applies to research and government institutions as well. The simplest
way of modeling such organization is via pyramid structure of units of the same size. Organization is
divided into   levels, numbered from top ( ). Each unit consists of a manager at level   and 
 subordinates (workgroup) at level  . With the exception of the topmost executive, each
employee has exactly one direct manager and each manager has exactly   subordinates.
The size of the whole organization is thus  . To achieve reasonable
number of levels and unit sizes we may restrict ourselves to   and   or  ,
resulting in organizations with enough structure and with size greater than 500 people. This
corresponds to businesses above the "Small Business" deﬁnition as described in U.S. Small
Business Administration Table of Small Business Size Standards (2008) The size has been chosen
to allow statistical effects and relative anonymity of employees to play signiﬁcant role in the
organization. In small companies the closer connection between employees and those responsible
for promotion decisions often allows better recognition of actual performance and competences,
diminishing effects of Dilbert-Peter Principle.
Agent characteristics
Real work and self-promotion
Employees are represented by computer agents numbered via subscript  . Each agent is2.9
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characterized by two parameters. The ﬁrst,  , is its capacity to perform real work at its current
position, called also raw productivity. We consider here two types of contributions: direct work (for
example value of sales achieved by a salesman, lines of code written by a programmer or research
papers published by a scientist) and managerial contribution, related to organizing, coaching and
monitoring efforts of others. Managers, by their actions, may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the sum of
individual results of their subordinates. This would correspond, to use the above examples, to overall
sales ﬁgures for a branch ofﬁce, code submitted by a software development group or the research
standing of a university department. We have decided to combine the two contributions into one
parameter, to keep the spirit of Peter principle, deﬁning one "competence", as appropriate for a given
position.
The second characteristics of an agent is the effort he or she puts into internal political positioning
(self-promotion) denoted by  . This parameter may include activities and skills that are quite
commonplace in modern organizations, for example twisting the facts to present one's own results in
a good light (“Power Point economy”), doing the opposite with respect to other employee
achievements, forming and nurturing of cliques and power circles. We consider here that effort   is
focused on personal interest of the agent and does not contribute to actual results – neither those
related to direct output, nor to management contributions. In this work we separate the “productive”
part of political activities (such as organizing, motivating, ensuring cooperation...), being an inherent
part of management activities and contributing to the real work done, from activities aimed at
personal gain.
In our simulations we assume that the   is drawn from Gaussian distribution centered around 
(a good value for   might be  , for reasons explained in the next section) with distribution width of 
, while for   the distribution is ﬂat from 0 to  . The two parameters are used to model the
actual results of the work done by the agent and the perception of the work done within the
organization. The resulting contribution to the organization productivity by the agent is given by the
difference 
(1)
This is a simple way of describing the fact that focusing on improving one's own position by political
activities must deduct some time from the time spent on actual work effort. On the other hand, effort
spent on political maneuvers improves the perceived results. This is described in a more complex
way, depending on additional parameter: organization's susceptibility to self-promotion (Eq. 3). Similar
trade-off between technical and social skills has been proposed by Faria (2000). It should be noted,
however, that in our approach   contains both the technical and social skills as deﬁned by Faria.
The change of responsibility upon promotion might result in a different optimal ratio of the two types of
skills, and therefore, in different value of   before and after promotion. We have used values of 
 in the simulations. This choice has been motivated by the use of multiplicative approach to
management contribution (discussed in the next section). The width of the Gaussian distribution of
capabilities used in results presented in this article was,  . Such distribution of   allows
occasional differences of individual productivity in the range of 200% or even more. The treatment of 
 is different: it measures an internal characteristic of a person, its drive to improve own position,
which does not improve the actual results in any way and has not been considered in the past. The
choice of ﬂat distribution   reﬂects relatively frequent cases of extreme behavior: from total lack of
focus on self-promotion to giving it large part of the total effort of the employee. Author personal
experiences lead to assumption of  ; there are people who do spend more than half of
time on political ploys aimed to advance their position.   is a fully adjustable parameter of the
model. Moreover, it should be remembered that within the model   of a given agent is not changed
when the agent is promoted to a higher level.2.11
2.12
Management contribution
To take into account the fact that in most organizations managers are measured on the results of the
teams they manage, we introduce here accumulated versions of the effective work and perceived
results, which combine the results of the manager and his or her subordinates. We have chosen to
use a multiplicative way of describing the inﬂuence of the manager on the results of the department.
This is by no means the only choice, but it provides a simple way of describing situation where a bad
manager ( ) would actually decrease the overall output of his department, while the good
manager ( ) would increase it. This multiplicative approach differs from additive view of
Pluchino et al. (2010), who propose that contributions at higher levels of hierarchy should be modeled
by simple addition of manager's results multiplied by an artiﬁcial factor ranging from 0.2 at the lowest
level to 1.0 at the top management, to simulate the increased importance of the higher levels of
hierarchy. Increase of productivity of given employee over time is a real phenomenon found in many
organizations, related with accumulation of skills and experiences. It would describe a horizontal
progress from an apprentice to an expert - within a given level of hierarchy. It is less suited to vertical
promotion and managerial tasks, where the contribution of a manager comes from organizing the
work of the subordinates. Moreover, additive approach can not describe the Dilbertian inﬂuence of
idiot bosses who often decrease the results of the departments they manage. The importance of the
individual contribution must be higher as we move up in the organization levels. Thus we propose
that effective results are given by 
(2)
where   denotes the agents that are directly managed by agent  . Due to recursive nature
of the above expression, the effective results of a manager   include contributions of all its
subordinates. For the lowest level of hierarchy  . In such model, if all agents have the
same value of   and   (no effort is wasted on political positioning) the results at a
given layer   are  , assigning much greater importance to the managers that in the additive
model. But if   then the manager decreases the summed contributions of his or hers
subordinates. Such model does not describe well situations where a manager combines the
managerial tasks with the same type of production as his or her subordinates (e.g. programming
team leader writing code, university department head doing his or her own research or sales
manager being directly responsible for some customers). However, above certain realistic size of the
workgroup, the qualitative results of our model remain unchanged by such assumption.
Perceived results
In contrast with the actual results, the perceived outcome for a manager is given by a combination of
the real results of his department (compared to the expected average at the appropriate level) and
the outcome of his political ploys. We have used a simple sum of these two factors 
(3)
where   is the average result at the level of the agent  .   is a numerical factor used to
model self-promotion importance - one of the key parameters in the simulations. We use the name
“susceptibility” for  , as it determines the relative importance of self-promotion in the selection of
candidates for promotion, and thus the way the organization responds to self interests of employees.
Such form of the perceived results allows normalization of its two components independently of the2.13
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level, number of subordinates etc. Agents with highest and lowest values of   would be the
candidates for promotion and sacking, respectively.
Using the assumptions about the distribution of raw output   and self-promotion   described in
Section 2.2.1, it is possible to calculate the averages of actual and perceived results at each
organization level in a situation where the capabilities of each agent are drawn randomly 
(4)
where 
(5)
The overall outcome of the political activities on the real and perceived results of an agent at a given
position are simply: increase of   leads to decrease of real contribution but increase of the
perceived one. Depending on the value of   playing politics may prove to be advantageous - or not.
As it turns out the result depends on the level of the organization, making the model more life-like.
Promotion, ﬁring and hiring
To model the processes of promotion in an organization we need to provide some assumptions as to
the personnel mobility within it. This requires balancing between model simplicity and the need to
cover realistic situations. The rules proposed apply to organization levels  . For the top level,
there is no competition and no hiring/ﬁring. Real organizations certainly experience changes at the
CEO level, and such changes can bring large differences in the overall performance. Charismatic
leaders, by their vision and management skills can radically change the evolution of their companies.
Such contributions are, however, impossible to simulate in a statistical computer model. Our goal is
to model internal competition and promotion mechanisms within an organization, coming from lower
levels. To allow such focus in our simulations we have assumed that the top manager has no
inﬂuence on the overall productivity, having  , and  .
At lower levels the ﬁring and promotion scheme easier to simulate. At each simulation step there is
some chance (given by parameter  ) that from each workgroup of   employees one would be
ﬁred. Thus the typical churn rate is the same at every level, being given by  , and the reason
for introducing   is to allow adjustment of the rate of change in the model. This would allow the
“simulation time” to reﬂect actual time for real organizations - we selected   equal to 0.05, for
which a single simulation step (corresponding to 3 months "real time") gives realistic ratio of ﬁred
employees. For comparison the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports in Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey that the layoffs and discharges monthly rate for the period between 2000 and 2009
varied between 1.2% and 2%. The rate calculated with our model parameters is 0.33%, but it should
be remembered that our model does not include mass layoffs and discharges due to disability or
illness.
While the chance of ﬁring is probabilistic, the choice of the agent to be ﬁred is almost-deterministic:
the worst perceived performer in each workgroup is selected. If two or more agents share the same
value of perceived productivity, the program randomly ﬁres one of them. The vacant positions can be
ﬁlled either by internal promotion or by external hiring. This can by described by assuming two
mechanisms of ﬁlling a given empty post, each with probability being a part of the model. First, there
is a probability   that the post will be ﬁlled by externally hired agent, with values of   and 
drawn from the same distributions as the original set of employees. The second option of ﬁlling a
vacancy is through direct promotion of the best performer (again, we measure perceived
performance!) of the organizational level directly below the vacancy. In any case, when two agents
have the same perceived performance, the one for promotion is chosen randomly. In presented2.18
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simulations we have used 10% probability of external hiring. The actual values of   parameter vary
considerabley between organizations, moreover, in real life that vary between varius levels within an
organization. For some types of positions (for example sales management and high level
management in commercial companies) the external hiring would be much more probable. On the
other hand in education, research or production companies, internal promotion is dominant. The
choice of the value of   resulted from intention to keep inﬂuence of Peter Principle rather high. In
presented results we used global promotion scope, where anyone from the lower level can be picked
to ﬁll the vacated post. The promotion will, of course, leave another vacancy to be ﬁlled at a lower
level. The hiring process should start at the highest vacancy and continue down. All the vacancies at
the lowest level are, obviously, ﬁlled by external hiring.
To describe the productivity of the employee after the promotion in the two scenarios introduced
before we use the following assumptions. For the Peter scenario, suitable in situations where the
new post calls for totally different set of skills (salesman promoted to sales manager or to marketing
manager position) the post-promotion value of productivity   is randomly drawn, without any
relation to previous  . On the other hand, for the continuity scenario, in which the productivity at
the higher level remains close to the previous one, agent's productivity changes by a small random
value of   
(6)
where   denotes agents capacity on the higher level. We assumed that   has normal
distribution centered at zero with width of   (we used value of 0.2 for   in results presented in
this paper). This hypothesis would be applicable to situations where the tasks at the higher hierarchy
level are largely similar to those at a lower level (advancement from programmer to programming
team leader, for example).
Depending on the organization the change of the scope of activity due to promotion, from direct
production (writing the code, visiting customers, conducting experiments) to managerial tasks of
organizing, planning and supervision may be more or less dramatic, pointing to Peter or continuity
scenario. In some real life situations it might be suitable to use a mixed model (for example stressing
the change of tasks when someone is promoted from the workpool to managerial levels), but this
paper is limited to pure scenarios. We remind here that we keep the   values unchanged for
individual agents regardless of their promotions.
Simulation considerations
During simulation process we are looking both at global changes of organization effectiveness
depending on the promotion model as well as individual career paths and results of individual
strategies . The simulation steps correspond to realistic conditions, e.g. quarters or semesters –
periods where typically performance of employees is reviewed and ﬁring/hiring decisions may be
taken. We run the simulations up to 64 steps (16 years). By experience, modern commercial
organizations stay in the same shape (without major reorganizations) for periods of 3-5 years. Such
stasis times are longer in governmental and educational organizations. Of course, major
reorganizations are not covered by the simplistic model described above. The individual results of
the simulation runs differed signiﬁcantly (as discussed in Section 3.1) and for each combination of
parameters we have accumulated results of 8000 runs, to obtain averages and distribution of key
characteristics.
The key parameters and characteristics of the simulated organization were:
Overall performance of the organization, given by the averages of effective total result of the
topmost manager   and its changes during simulation steps, as well as effective
performances of organization units at different levels, as given by their bosses'  . We also
recorded the number of new hires compared to internal promotions, to check the initial
assumptions It is worth noting that these parameters are comparable to real world data, as3.1
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such comparison could lead to improvements of the model (for example probabilities of
external hiring depending on the level of the vacancy).
Monitoring true productivity and self-promotion factor at various levels of the organization.
Average   for each level   as well as the average value of raw individual productiveness
 were calculated at each step of the simulations; to check if it is the political
manipulators or the real workers who move to the upper echelons, as suggested by common
sense.
The simulations were coded in Fortran95. The code is available from the Author on request.
 Results
The model presented in this work is rather complex, involving several parameters designed to mimic
at least some of the crucial aspects of modern organizational life. This complexity, however, makes
deriving clear dependencies rather difﬁcult. For the purpose of this preliminary paper we decided to
divide the system controls into two groups. The ﬁrst contains those that are static between various
simulations, for example the parameters describing the distributions of   and  . We have also
kept the ﬁring rate   and the external hiring rate   ﬁxed and selected to to keep the “simulation
time” as close as possible to the real world, and to obtain reasonable values of the churn ratio and
average time spent as given position.
The second group contained controls that were varied between simulated organizations, describing
their main characteristics: number of levels and workgroup size, type of post-promotion efﬁciency
model (Peter hypothesis, continuity model) and organization susceptibility to self-promotion,  .
We present here results for a multi-level hierarchy comprised of 5 levels with 5 people in a
workgroup. This choice was motivated by a desire to keep the overall size moderate. Based on the
distribution of   and   deﬁned in Section 2, we can derive two “yardstick” measures of the total
organization productivity. The ﬁrst, is the average productivity in a wholly random organization,
including the negative effects of time and effort lost on political games. The   value for
random distribution is, with our choice of parameters, rather low, equal to 105 (Eq. 4). This is, of
course, due to the largely negative impact of the managerial structure, where every manager
decreases the production of his/her department by a factor of   (0.7 for our
choice of parameters). This value is also a starting point of the dynamic simulations, as the initial
conditions use random distribution of agent characteristics. It should be noted that the random
conﬁguration and associated productivity seems highly unrealistic, as it means that all managers
negatively inﬂuence the outcome. For this reason, we have used productivity of neutral organization
as the criterion of the improvement vs. decline of the total output in the simulations. Interestingly
enough, some combinations of parameters resulted in simulation runs that were worse than the
random one. We should remind here that negative selection is real, and some organizations may
indeed seem to perform worse than if they were staffed through random hiring. This is especially true
if the organization itself is under no threat to its existence nor in competition, as is often true for
government structures.
The other, more realistic measure of global effectiveness, which we would call “neutral productivity”,
assumes that no self-promotion take place ( ) and that all workers and managers have the
same effective  . Then the organization's output is simply given by the number of
lowest level workers (as managers neither improve nor diminish the results). In the case of the 5-by-
5 structure  . Despite the fact that in all simulations the pool of agents' individual
capabilities remained the same, the ﬁnal long term results of the model organization, depending on
the post-promotion productivity scenario and the susceptibility to self-promotion varied by almost an
order of magnitude, from much below   to more than four times better than this value!
Simulation statistics3.5 Due to the multiplicative way the managerial contribution is modeled here, the inﬂuence of individual
characteristics of managers, especially at high positions, can signiﬁcantly change the overall
productivity of the organization. As a result we observe rather wide distribution of results between
simulation runs. As an example, Figure 1 presents distribution functions of overall productivity 
 for the Peter model for various values of the susceptibility factor  , at different stages of
the evolution starting from random conﬁguration: after 3, 5 and 16 years. Figure 2 presents similar
data for a set of simulations in the continuity model.
Figure 1: Distribution of   values for Peter model (organization with 5 levels
with 5 positions in a workgroup) depending on   value after 3, 5 and 16 years.Probabilities of   are very well described by Gaussian distributions. Increased
values of   shift the center of the distribution to smaller values and decrease the
width of the distribution – top left curves in each panel correspond to  , bottom
right to  .The distributions were displaced vertically for clarity for increasing 
 values.
Figure 2: Distribution of   values for continuity model (organization with 5
levels with 5 positions in a workgroup) depending on C value after 3, 5 and 16 years.
Probabilities of   are very well described by Gaussian distributions.The3.6
distributions were displaced vertically for clarity for increasing   values.
The distributions of   are well described by Gaussian functions. This allows us to use, in
presenting further results, peak center positions. It intersting to observe that the widths of the
distributions are rather high and strongly correlated with the position of the peak center (Fig. 3). The
half-width and half maximum (HWHM) varied between more than 20% of the average value for the
Peter model, 3 years from the start of the simulations to still sizeable 10% for the continuity model
after 16 years. In the continuity model we observe strong reduction of the width of the distribution of 
 with the passage of time, but even after 16 years of continuous evolution, there are still
signiﬁcant differences of results between individual simulation runs. We note here that the average
values of   and   for organization level   have similar Gaussian distributions.
Figure 3: Correlations between the maximum of the   distribution in multiple
simulation runs and the width of the distribution. Point series correspond to situation
after 3 and 16 years, and each series is given by different susceptibility   values,
ranging from   at bottom left corner to   at the top right corner.3.7 The time evolution of average values of   and   for various organization levels are – for
most parameter combinations – reasonably well described by exponentially decaying functions of
time 
(7)
(8)
For very low values of   the self-promotion is selected against, thus   decreases with time for
both continuity and Peter models. For large values of   selection favors high political activity
and thus   grows. In the intermediate regime of   we observe more complex
behavior of  , remaining close to the average value for random distribution. On the other hand, the
true productivity in both models is observed to grow with time. Obviously this increase is much
higher for the continuity model, where the promotion preserves, at least partially, the   values, so
that talent and competencies are not lost.Figure 4: Time evolution of average   and   values for the continuity
model; 5 levels of 5 positions in a workgroup. Colors correspond to various values of
the susceptibility  , ranging from   (blue), through   (green), 
(olive),   (yellow),   (orange) and   (red).3.8
Figure 5: Time evolution of average   and   values for the Peter model; 5
levels of 5 positions in a workgroup.
Global effectiveness
We shall focus now on the main model controls: the post-promotion effectiveness model (Peter or
continuity) and the organization susceptibility to internal self promotion,  . Both factors play a
crucial role in the evolution of the organization effectiveness. Let us discuss ﬁrst the differences
between the two post-promotion models. The continuity model, even in the presence of strong
susceptibility to internal PR, predicts improvement of the individual productivity   with time at
higher levels of organization. Selection of best (perceived) performers coupled with limited3.9
3.10
“inheritance” of the individual productivity signiﬁcantly improves the average values, and as result,
leads to much higher values of overall true productivity than in the Peter model.
Figure 6: Comparison of overall organization effectiveness for the
continuity and Peter models as function of susceptibility  .
The difference between the productivity in continuity model and Peter model can be as high as 5
times, as shown in Fig. 6. Selection process for the continuity model, even for very large values of
susceptibility   (when agents with high focus on self-promotion are at advantage), leads to
performance better than for the random assignment of agent capacities – but lower than the neutral
conﬁguration, when internal politics plays no role. For the Peter model at large   values the
evolution may lead to decrease of productivity from the starting random conﬁguration! This seems to
be a very bad sign for any organization. For some combinations of parameters this decrease,
happening over a short period of less than 10 quarters, diminished the productivity by a factor of 2
(see, for example, Fig. 8).
The following ﬁgures 7 and 8 show time evolution of average organization productivity (starting from
a random conﬁguration), dependence of this productivity on the susceptibility   after 3, 5 and 16
years of evolution and similar dependence of the average   and   values at various levels of the
organization. Overall productivity has been normalized to that of a neutral organization. Such
normalization allows to see the effects independently to organization size and number of levels. For
very small susceptibility values, the continuity scenario, with its positive selection of productivity 
gives results that are 4 times better than neutral organization, while for the Peter scenario the
improvement in only by 20%. In both scenarios we observe strong, negative inﬂuence of increasing
susceptibility   on overall results. After 16 years, for the continuity scenario, the results are slightly
below those of neutral organisation, while for Peter scenario the results are at the level of 15% of the
neutral benchmark. This means that Dilbert Principle decreases productivity more than ﬁvefold.
Importantly, the drop of performance is signiﬁcant even for relatively low values of  = 2.Figure 7: Simulation results for the continuity model, 5 layers, 5 positions in a
workgroup. Upper panels: time evolution and dependence of overall productivity 
 on organization susceptibility  , divided by productivity of neutral
organization of the same size. Lower panels: dependence of average   and 
values on   at the end of the third, ﬁfth and 16th year of evolution.4.1
Figure 8: Simulation results for the Peter model, 5 layers, 5 positions in a workgroup.
Upper panels: time evolution and dependence of overall productivity   on
organization susceptibility  , divided by productivity of neutral organization of the
same size. Lower panels: dependence of average   and   values on   at the end
of the third, ﬁfth and 16th year of evolution.
 Conclusions
Discussion of results
The general results of the simulations are not surprising (just as the original observations of Peter
and Adams are not surprising). Everyday observations show that there are many organizations, big
and small, commercial and governmental, where promotions and demotions follow political ploys and
not the real capability of an employee to fulﬁll speciﬁc roles. And it is quite obvious to both internal
and external observers, that the performance of these organizations may be far from optimal. Thus
our model has no “discovery” value, but is, more or less, a mathematical toy, reﬂecting some aspects
of the social reality. Obviously, it misses a lot of factors that are present in real life: individuality and
creativeness of the leaders; innovative, market disruptive products or ideas; well established
processes and organizational culture that effectively guide individual players; capacity to change the
organizational form to adapt to new challenges. All these can be crucial in determining the success or
a failure of the organization. On the other hand, the processes related to promotion and internal
politics included in the model are present in almost all types of organizations and can negatively
impact their results. The main idea behind the model is to look for some simple controls that could4.2
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allow some general policy suggestions – as it turns out some model parameters are more important
than others. For example, the model allows to include phenomenon of blame-shifting by the
managers. A badly performing manager, threatened with being ﬁred, can point to one of his or her
subordinates as the reason for bad performance and ﬁre the person to preserve own position. Such
phenomenon is quite common. It turns out that the presence of blame-shifting inﬂuences the
simulated overall performance only to a minor degree. Therefore, if we look to measures improving
the organization productivity, we should note that such self-preservation instincts are natural
(although clearly immoral), and it is very hard to avoid them. Another model variable, degree of pre-
screening of external candidates, provides much higher inﬂuence on the resulting productivity
(especially in the continuity model). But for most of modern organizations such competitive nature of
hiring is already present, so there is little room for improvement here. The two major factors are the
capability to preserve the skills and efﬁciency of an employee after the promotion and susceptibility
of an organization to self-promotion, or, in other words, capacity to recognize the real values. Here
the differences in overall productivity can be as high as an order of magnitude. Thus, the model
suggests that organizations should focus on measures eliminating negative effects due to Peter
Principle and to self-promotion. Such measures include:
Using measurable and objective criteria for employee evaluation. This is relatively easy for
some areas (for example in sales departments), but rather difﬁcult in creative environments
(scientiﬁc research, software engineering). Yet despite the difﬁculty, such standards would
decrease the employee's drive to use political skills for self-promotion, instead of focusing on
the needed tasks.
Giving prospective candidates for promotion tasks related to the nature of duties at the higher
level (e.g. temporary management of small groups, responsibility for analysis of results and
preparing directions for action for workgroups and departments etc.) and measuring results of
such assignments. These results should be used when considering promotion, as they
estimate the productivity at the higher level, and thus decrease the effect of Peter Principle.
Introduction of horizontal advancement paths, in which employees who do not ﬁt into the
traditional promotion model (for example brilliant engineers lacking managerial skills) would still
be able to achieve satisfaction within a company, without falling prey to the Peter Principle trap.
There is a large body of literature devoted to consequences of promotion models to individual and
general organization productivity, including works that are focused on analysis of Peter Principle (for
example Audas et al (2004), Barmby et al (2006), Dickinson and Villeval (2007), Gibbons and
Waldman (2006), Koch and Nafziger (2007), Lazear and Rosen (1981), Lazear (2001), Lazear
(2004), MacLeod and Malcolmson (1988), Valsecchi (2003) ). Most of these works consider the
effects of promotions taking into account both the goals of the employer and the employee. The most
important difference between the models used in the quoted sources and our simpliﬁed model, is that
we did not cover the economic analysis on the employee side. There are no incentives for promotion
- it is assumed that all employees, by deﬁnition, are interested in moving to higher positions. Such
assumption is obviously far from the actual situations in real life, where some employees are risk
adverse and prefer to stay in current positions.
In our model we compare the relative perceived performance of agents at a given level of hierarchy
as candidates for promotion. This is reminiscent of the tournament method of promotion selection
(Lazear (1981)) as opposed to measurement of performance against a pre-deﬁned standards. The
difference in our model is that instead of comparing results of two workers we pick the best relative
performers from a much larger pool of candidates. This has, of course a limitation to organizations
where cross-departmental promotion is possible. It should be remarked here that even in the case of
traditional tournaments Lazear (2001) has already predicted that in environments where there are
"low quality" and "high quality" employees, the low quality employees would attempt to contaminate
high quality ﬁrms. Direct inclusion of self-promotion in our model provides additional means for such
corruption of quality.
Additional limitation of our model is in stability of agent's "proﬁle" in time. There is no increase of
productivity at a given post with experience (as discussed, for example, by Koch and Nafziger
(2007)). Nor do we introduce positive effects brought by training and learning. These effects are
certainly important in real life. Providing newly promoted employees with training, coaching and
allowing some "starting time", during which measurement criteria are somewhat relaxed, to gather
experience are common actions of many organizations. They mitigate, to certain extent, the effects
of Peter Principle, but in Author's opinion they can do little against Dilbert Principle and people who
are focused on self-promotion. Thus, including self-promotion factor in productivity model diminishes
the positive effects of greater experience in organization allows agents with high   to attain high
positions (by having large value of susceptibility  ).
Faria (2000) has presented an analysis of a combination of Peter and Dilbert Principles in a model
describing suboptimal choices in an internal job market, with a split of managerial skills into technical
and social. The proposed explanation of the origin of Dilbert Principle is different from ours. Faria
assumed that organization could promote an employee who is below a competence optimum. Such4.6
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choice would lead to the Dilbert Principle, but it is hard to understand, within the model proposed by
Faria, why such suboptimal choice would be made. Although our model is more simpliﬁed than the
one proposed by Faria (we do not split the skills into technical/social) it provides some quantiﬁable
"explanation" for the wrong promotion decisions by the employer. Our notion of self-promotion is a
practical realization of remark by Faria that if promotion decisions are made on the basis of proxies
for the output rather than on measurable output, workers might put more emphasis on proxies than
on output itself.
Most of the traditional literature focuses on individual contributions to organization output. The total
output is assumed to result from summing of outputs of employees. Thus, promotion decisions are
based on tournaments which compare individual productivity. In many real life situations this is far
from truth. Due to team nature of many tasks the evaluation of promotion criteria often depends not
only on the direct contribution of an employee, but also on the contributions of all team members, for
example subordinates. Sales manager performance is measured not on his or her individual results,
but on sales of the group of people being managed. Research institute head repotation depends not
only on what she or he publishes, but on cumulative research achievements of the institute. And so
on. The comparisons of performance used in our model take such teamwork into account. However,
as we already remarked, summing up individual contributions can not reproduce the possible
negative inﬂuences of managers on team performance, unless we assume that negative outputs are
possible. But even in the last case, additive model can not handle easily situations in which
promotion of bad manager can have much larger negative inﬂuences simply because after promotion
the manager may negatively affect the output of many more people. For these reasons we have
opted for rather unusual multiplicative contribution model at management positions, which addresses
the issues in a natural way.
Improving organization performance
Within the simulation model, even a moderate decrease of the organization susceptibility to political
ploys, and improvement of the “heritability” of skills after promotion may lead to dramatic
improvement of overall productivity, not by single percentage points but by a signiﬁcant factor. To
show this we have simulated effects of changes in organization policies related to promotion and
susceptibility to self-interests in a “mature” environment. In such simulations an organization resulting
from some years of evolution under one set of parameters would be used as the starting point of a
new simulation, for example with a changed value of  . This would correspond to corrective
measures undertaken by top management, for example when a new CEO comes on board. The
main question of such studies would be to determine, for example, the expected improvements due
to lowering of susceptibility or the time it takes to see such improvement take the effect. Figure 9
presents results of such simulations showing that the improvement of overall effectiveness due to
both possible courses of action: decreasing susceptibility to self-promotion and changing the post-
promotion scenario from Peter to continuity. We have arbitrarily assumed that the corrective
measures are undertaken in the middle of the simulated period of 16 years, giving the organization
the same amount of time to recover as the time of negative impact of Dilbert-Peter Principle. We
studied corrective measures taken only against self-promotion, only against effects of Peter Principle
and combined effort. The two corrective strategies, although leading to comparable individual
improvements in total performance, act in different ways. Diminishing company susceptibility to self-
promotion decreases  , leaving resulting individual productivities almost unchanged. Changing
post-promotion model from Peter to continuity (achieved, for example by suitable training and/or
screening of promotion candidates with respect to tasks on the higher hierarchy level) increases 
, leaving self-promotion   unchanged. In the case when both actions take place the increase of
effectiveness is as high as by a factor of 20 for the chosen parameters. What is important is that the
improvement in productivity happens rather fast, so that there can be a positive feedback, showing to
top management that the decisions are bearing fruit and strengthening the resolve.
Our model focuses on negative effects of Peter Principle and distortion of the observed output of
employees due to self-promotion. The improvement strategies described above obviously miss other
actions, such as education and training, which would result in improvement of employee productivity
at current post. Such actions are especially important in promotion situations, to combat the
decrease of productivity due to Peter principle, but they are beyond the scope of the simulations
presented here.4.9
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Figure 9: Changes in overall organization performance (compared to neutral
organization) and average values of   and   due to changes in organization
policies. Starting organization is highly ineffective: has very high susceptibility to self-
promotion and uses Peter model of post-promotion effectiveness  . The
effectiveness of such organization, as already noted is very low. Left column: after 8
years of evolution the company changed the susceptibility to minimal value 
, resulting in rapid decrease of the self-promotion. Middle column: the
company changed the post-promotion model to continuity scenario, without changing 
, resulting in improvement of the productivity. Right column: the company changed
both the post-promotion model from Peter to continuity and decreased   from 5 to
0.01. In the last case the cumulative effects led to dramatic increase of performance of
the whole organization. Dotted lines show results when no change is introduced.
Model extensions
The initial model presented here can be expanded in several directions. The best source of
improvement of the model would be when the computer simulation could be coupled with some
“microscopic” sociology studies (for example interviews focused on measuring the payoff of political
activities within the organization). Especially, if one could provide comparative studies of general
effectiveness of organizations built upon different social models. The model itself is quite ﬂexible and
allows many improvements. Such extensions of the computer model would still miss the effects due
to individuality of participants and speciﬁc nature of the organization but bring the simulated strictures
still closer to reality.
To make the model more realistic one might divide the organization into a few 'divisions'. Promotion4.11
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within a division (e.g. sales, marketing, manufacturing) should be based on a common sense
hypothesis, as a lot of workload remains the same, so the effective results should be changing only
partially. On the other hand, promotion across the departments should be less frequent and the new
value of raw productivity would be totally uncorrelated.
Yet another direction of further research is the study of dependence of overall output and
effectiveness per employee in a growing organization – as most of real life organizations are
dynamically changing their size.
The model can also be improved by including effects evaluation of potential candidates for hiring and
of employee dissatisfaction and restlessness when they are not promoted. It is relatively easy to
include effects of pre-screening of external candidates, for example by choosing the best agent from
several candidates. This improves the quality even if the number of reviewed candidates is as small
as 4. Of course, in the spirit of the current work, the compared quality would be properly normalized
perceived potential performance, given, for example by  . There is,
however, another process which counterbalances such gains due to pre-screening. In the current
paper, the external candidates come from an inﬁnite pool of agents with random characteristics. In
real life they would be the people from appropriate levels of other organizations (usually quite similar
to the studied one). By symmetry, these effects should be included in the study: a process of agents
leaving the company to join other ones. In contrast with ﬁring of the worst perceived performers, here
the agents most likely to leave would be the ones who have relatively high opinion of themselves and
willingness to seek new opportunities. These qualities, in the ﬁrst approximation are related to the
self-promotion drive   The probability should increase with time spent at the same position. As a
result, increases of productivity introduced by the pre-screening of external candidates would be
counterbalanced by the outﬂow of the restless, disgruntled employees.
The extensions mentioned above could allow the model to be used for concrete organizations. This
would provide more practical value, extending beyond the current conclusions that combating the
Peter scenario and self-promotion may quickly and signiﬁcantly improve real productivity of
organizations.
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